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Note 
“Over-the-Hill” Yet Still Fighting Uphill Battles to 
Find Jobs: The Plight of Older Job Applicants Under 
the ADEA 
LINDSEY A. VISCOMI 
This Note discusses the unresolved issue of whether the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA) protects older job applicants from disparate impact 
discrimination, arguing that they should, in fact, be covered. This Note starts with 
an examination of the disparate impact framework and how arbitrary employment 
qualifications can operate indirectly to restrict the employment of older workers. It 
then goes into a statutory analysis of the pertinent sections of the ADEA and 
considers several different statutory interpretation methods. This Note will argue 
that the interpretation of the statute should align with its underlying purpose, which 
is to prohibit employers from discriminating against older people and to help older 
workers who have been displaced from work to regain employment.  
This Note then summarizes recent case law interpreting the issue, discussing 
the most recent developments in differing circuits. Both the Seventh and Eleventh 
Circuits have now effectively held that older job applicants do not have an available 
disparate impact claim under the ADEA. This Note argues for a different 
interpretation of the ADEA that would afford older job applicants the same 
protections as other protected groups who face similar barriers in employment. 
This Note suggests several remedial measures that may address this problem 
for the aging workforce. These recommendations include that advocates bring cases 
that enable other circuits to weigh in on this issue and create a circuit split to bring 
it to the Supreme Court so that the highest court can clarify the ambiguous language 
of the ADEA. Alternatively, a congressional amendment to the ADEA to expressly 
include applicants in the language of the statute would eliminate any ambiguity with 
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“Over-the-Hill” Yet Still Fighting Uphill Battles to 
Find Jobs: The Plight of Older Job Applicants Under 
the ADEA 
LINDSEY A. VISCOMI * 
INTRODUCTION 
“There is . . . no harsher verdict in most men’s lives than 
someone else’s judgment that they are no longer worth their 
keep.”1 
Today, an “Over-the-Hill” 40th birthday party can implicate more than 
just getting closer to obtaining an AARP card. According to the Eleventh 
Circuit in Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (Villarreal II),2  and the 
Seventh Circuit in Kleber v. CareFusion Corp. (Kleber II),3 individuals over 
forty have no remedy if employers subject them to practices that have a 
disparate impact on older job applicants and have no reasonable business 
purpose—such as rejecting applicants for being overqualified4 or having too 
much experience.5 Yet, recent case law shows that courts have a hard time 
deciding this issue, signaling that hope is not yet lost for older applicants. 
When the Eleventh Circuit6 and Seventh Circuit7 first considered this issue, 
the two courts decided the cases differently, holding that job applicants were 
also protected by the same statutory provision that protects current 
                                                                                                                     
* University of Connecticut School of Law, Juris Doctorate Candidate 2020; Bentley University, 
magna cum laude, B.S. in Business Management 2017. I would like to extend my greatest thanks to 
Professor Jon Bauer for contributing his time and expertise in the development of this Note. I would also 
like to acknowledge my colleagues on the Connecticut Law Review for their many diligent edits. Thank 
you to my family for their constant love and support—this Note is lovingly dedicated to my late 
grandmother, who was always my biggest supporter. 
1 REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR TO THE CONGRESS UNDER SECTION 715 OF THE CIVIL 
RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER: AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 1 
(1965) [hereinafter WIRTZ REPORT]. 
2 839 F.3d 958 (11th Cir. 2016) [hereinafter Villarreal II] (en banc).  
3 914 F.3d 480 (7th Cir. 2019) [hereinafter Kleber II] (en banc).  
4 Villarreal II, 839 F.3d at 961 (validating the screening out of applicants with job requirements 
which “‘stay[ed] away from’ applicants ‘in sales for 8–10 years’”).  
5 Kleber II, 914 F.3d at 481–82 (stating the fact that Dale Kleber had more experience than the job 
description required, and CareFusion passed over Kleber, instead hiring a 29-year-old applicant who did 
not exceed the prescribed experience requirement). 
6 Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 806 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2015) [hereinafter Villarreal 
I], vacated, reh’g granted en banc, 839 F.3d 958 (11th Cir. 2016). 
7 Kleber v. CareFusion Corp., 888 F.3d 868 (7th Cir. 2018) [hereinafter Kleber I], vacated, reh’g 
granted en banc, 914 F.3d 480 (7th Cir. 2019).  
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employees from disparate impact discrimination.8 Recently, however, both 
circuits granted motions for a rehearing en banc, and vacated the Villarreal 
I and Kleber I holdings,9 over strong dissents. This Note argues that the 
Seventh and Eleventh Circuits got it right the first time. The statutory text, 
Congress’s intent, and agency interpretations all point toward recognizing 
that job applicants, as well as employees, should be able to bring disparate 
impact claims under the ADEA.  
Congress enacted the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) 
in 1967,10 seeking to prohibit age discrimination in employment.11 This 
statute shortly followed Congress’s enactment of Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, which prohibited discrimination on the basis of race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin.12 These two statutes have played a 
significant role in combatting workplace discrimination. Nonetheless, this 
Note reveals that the ADEA has yet to be enforced consistently with its 
intent. 
Before Congress enacted the ADEA, the Department of Labor was 
directed to research and study “the factors which might tend to result in 
discrimination in employment because of age and the consequences of such 
discrimination.”13 The resulting study came to be known as the Wirtz 
Report. This Report examined “circumstances which unquestionably affect 
older workers more strongly, as a group, than they do younger workers,”14 
which included questions of health, educational attainment, and 
technological change.15 It notably expressed specific concern about the 
plight of older job seekers, finding that there was persistent and widespread 
use of age limits in hiring.16 The Report also noted that the type of 
discrimination older workers “have most to fear” was not from “employer 
malice” but rather from “wholly impersonal forces,” such as the use of 
                                                                                                                     
8 See id. at 870 (holding “that § 623(a)(2) [of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967] 
protects both outside job applicants and current employees”). See also Villarreal I, 806 F.3d at 1290 
(holding that section 4(a)(2) of the ADEA authorizes disparate impact claims by applicants for 
employment because “the agency charged with enforcing the ADEA, has reasonably and consistently 
interpreted the statute to cover claims like Mr. Villarreal’s”). 
9 See Erin Mulvaney, Full US Appeals Court Will Look at Scope of Federal Age-Discrimination 
Law, NAT’L L.J. (June 22, 2018, 3:57 PM), https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2018/06/22/full-u-
s-appeals-court-will-look-at-scope-of-federal-age-discrimination-law/ (declaring the dispute as one “that 
tests the power of job applicants, not just current employees, to sue employers for alleged age 
discrimination”). 
10 See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967) 
(stating the act prohibiting age discrimination in employment was enacted on December 15, 1967). 
11 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1994) (“It is therefore the purpose of this chapter . . . to prohibit arbitrary 
age discrimination in employment . . . .”).  
12 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012). 
13 WIRTZ REPORT, supra note 1, at ii.  
14 Id. at 11.  
15 Id. at 11–13. 
16 Id. at 21. 
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educational requirements that work against the employment of many older 
workers who, at the time of the Report, had less formal education on the 
whole than younger workers.17 Therefore, the Wirtz Report recommended 
that the government institute a national policy of hiring on the “basis of 
ability rather than age.”18 The Report became the catalyst to the enactment 
of the ADEA, and courts often refer to the Wirtz Report when analyzing the 
intent behind the ADEA. The Wirtz Report makes it clear that Congress 
enacted the ADEA in part to address the barriers that older applicants face 
when seeking employment. 
According to the U.S. Census Bureau, one in every five residents will 
be older than sixty-five in 2030.19 The number of older workers is on the 
rise20 with about forty percent of people aged fifty-five and older working 
or actively looking for work in 2014.21 Because the rate of older workers and 
applicants is increasing, the prevalence of this issue is mounting. Therefore, 
it is imperative that courts interpret the ADEA consistent with its underlying 
intent, which is to protect older applicants from the unfair burdens they face 
in their job searches that are not legitimately job-related. The courts should 
afford the same protections to older job applicants as other protected groups, 
or Congress should amend the ADEA to effectuate its intent to protect older 
Americans who are disparately impacted by discriminatory barriers in 
hiring. 
Part I of this Note reviews the disparate impact framework under Title 
VII and the ADEA. Part II considers various methods of statutory 
interpretation as they apply to the question of whether job applicants may 
bring disparate impact claims under the ADEA, including textual analysis, 
comparisons to other provisions of the ADEA and Title VII, the legislative 
history, and agency interpretations. This part lays out arguments on both 
sides of the issue, analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of each argument. 
Part III examines the most recent case law involving claims brought under 
the ADEA for disparate impact in hiring. This part discusses the various 
legal arguments that the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits have addressed in 
their opinions.  
Part IV contends that the purely textual approach to statutory 
construction, which the majorities in the circuit court opinions favored, leads 
to an absurdity in results. This part questions the plausibility that Congress 
                                                                                                                     
17 Id. at 3.  
18 Id. at 22.  
19 Erika McEntarfer, Older People Working Longer, Earning More, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Apr. 
24, 2018), https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2018/04/aging-workforce.html.  
20 Id.  
21 Mitra Toossi & Elka Torpey, Older Workers: Labor Force Trends and Career Options, U.S. 
BUREAU LAB. STAT. (May 2017), https://www.bls.gov/careeroutlook/2017/article/older-workers.htm. 
The forty percent statistic is known as the labor force participation rate, which is also “expected to 
increase fastest for the oldest segments of the population—most notably, people ages 65 to 74 and 75 
and older—through 2024.” Id.  
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intended to make the arbitrary distinction that these courts have read into a 
minor difference in wording. Part IV also argues that the statutory language 
can, and should, be read to allow for disparate impact claims by older job 
applicants.  
Part V recommends two different approaches to address this problem in 
light of the current case law. The first is for advocates not to give up on other 
circuits deciding this issue in a more favorable way. A favorable circuit court 
decision would create a circuit split, likely giving rise to Supreme Court 
review. The second is a congressional amendment to the ADEA, which 
would eliminate any ambiguity and finally offer full protection to older 
applicants in employment. 
I. DISPARATE IMPACT FRAMEWORK AND THE ADEA 
In the instance of older Americans, it is seldom the case that employers 
are intentionally discriminating against them out of “dislike or intolerance,” 
as can be found with cases of discrimination on the basis of “race, color, 
religion, or national origin.”22 However, negative stereotypes and misplaced 
assumptions about older individuals’ work ability are commonplace.23 Age 
discrimination is based primarily upon unfounded assumptions about the 
relationship between an individual’s age and his or her ability to perform a 
job.24  
But age discrimination does not have to be based on those stereotypical 
assumptions in order to be considered unlawful. Certain job qualifications 
might affect older workers more heavily, as a group, than they do younger 
workers.25 For example, imagine an employer that has a policy of only hiring 
individuals with less than five years of experience in their field. This hiring 
policy is neutral on its face because younger workers and older workers alike 
may have less than five years of experience in that certain field. However, 
this policy disproportionately impacts older workers because it is more 
likely that older workers, rather than younger workers, will have exceeded 
that experience cap. 
This Note is concerned with the types of arbitrary employment practices 
that operate indirectly to restrict the employment of older workers in a 
                                                                                                                     
22 WIRTZ REPORT, supra note 1, at 5 (finding that there was no significant evidence of intentional 
discrimination).  
23 Thomas W.H. Ng & Daniel C. Feldman, Evaluating Six Common Stereotypes About Older 
Workers with Meta-Analytical Data, 65 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 821, 826 (2012) (noting that “negative 
stereotypes about aging are often socially constructed from observations of the declining health of very 
old people who have long since retired . . . [and] [t]here is less evidence . . . that older workers who are 
still actively employed are especially susceptible to health problems”). 
24 WIRTZ REPORT, supra note 1, at 2. 
25 See id. at 11–13 (listing examples of “certain circumstances which unquestionably affect older 
workers more strongly, as a group, than they do younger workers” such as health, educational attainment, 
and technological change). 
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discriminatory manner.26 Discrimination in the employment of older 
workers still exists in America and will continue to flourish until courts 
interpret the ADEA to protect older workers from “employment practices 
which . . . unintentionally lead to age limits in hiring.”27  
Unlawful discrimination can take two different forms: disparate 
treatment28 and disparate impact.29 A claimant can prove disparate treatment 
by establishing that an employer treated him or her less favorably than 
another worker of a different group and the individual’s protected 
characteristic (such as race, sex, or age) was the reason for that differential 
treatment, thereby making intent a crucial element.30 To prove disparate 
impact, however, a plaintiff need only establish that a particular employment 
practice has an adverse effect on workers of his or her group. This shifts the 
burden to the defendant to show that the practice has a sufficiently strong 
business justification.31 Therefore, proof of discriminatory motive is not 
required under a disparate impact theory of liability.32 
The Supreme Court has long recognized that both Title VII and the 
ADEA cover disparate treatment.33 Disparate impact, on the other hand, has 
had a more distinctive historical development in the law. The Supreme 
Court, interpreting statutory language similar to that appearing in the ADEA, 
first held disparate impact to be a violation of Title VII in 1971.34 However, 
                                                                                                                     
26 Id. at 5.  
27 Id. at 22. 
28 See, e.g., Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977) (“‘Disparate 
treatment’ . . . is the most easily understood type of discrimination. The employer simply treats some 
people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”); Hannah 
Arterian Furnish, A Path Through the Maze: Disparate Impact and Disparate Treatment Under Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 After Beazer and Burdine, 23 B.C. L. REV. 419, 419 (1982) (“In a disparate 
treatment case, the plaintiff attempts to demonstrate that he is the victim of intentional, but covert, 
discrimination.”). 
29 See, e.g., Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335–36 n.15 (stating that disparate impact involves 
“employment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall 
more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity”); Furnish, supra 
note 28, at 419 (“In a disparate impact case the plaintiff attempts to demonstrate that a neutral rule, fair 
on its face and objectively applied, has a significantly greater effect on persons protected under Title VII 
than on the majority group.”). 
30 Michael Evan Gold, Disparate Impact Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 
25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 4 (2004). See also Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15 (“Proof of 
discriminatory motive is critical . . . .”). 
31 Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2514–15 
(2015).  
32 Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335–36 n.15. 
33 See 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2012) (covering disparate treatment as a violation of the ADEA); 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (establishing a disparate treatment cause 
of action under Title VII). See also Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 609 (1993) (“The disparate 
treatment theory is of course available under the ADEA, as the language of the statute makes clear.”). 
34 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 427–28 (1971) (prohibiting an employment policy that 
required a high school education and passage of two aptitude tests which was disproportionately 
disqualifying black applicants). “What is required by Congress is the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and 
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after that, the Supreme Court declined to address the availability of disparate 
impact under the ADEA for over thirty years.35 It was not until 2005 that the 
Supreme Court held, for the first time, that the ADEA authorizes disparate 
impact claims.36 The first case to do so, however, involved a claim from a 
group of current employees,37 which left unanswered the question of 
whether job applicants, in addition to current employees, could bring 
disparate impact claims. Two circuit courts have considered this issue,38 but 
the issue has yet to reach the Supreme Court. 
Under the ADEA, proving a disparate impact claim is similar to, but in 
some respects different from, doing so under Title VII. Title VII allows for 
an affirmative defense from a claim of disparate impact if the employer can 
prove that its practice is both “job related for the position in question and 
consistent with business necessity.”39 For example, if an employer were to 
implement a diploma and test requirement for employment or promotion, as 
they did in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., the employer has the burden of 
proving that those requirements “bear a demonstrable relationship to 
successful performance of the jobs for which it was used.”40 If the 
requirements operate to exclude a protected class, and they cannot be shown 
to be related to job performance, then the requirements are prohibited. 
However, the Supreme Court has held that the Title VII business 
necessity test has “no place in ADEA disparate-impact cases.”41 Rather, the 
ADEA prohibits practices that have a disparate impact unless the employer 
can show that the practice is based on a reasonable factor other than age—
also known as the RFOA defense.42 The Supreme Court took into account 
the ADEA’s distinct RFOA provision and found that Title VII had no “like-
worded defense,”43 making it unique and controlling only in matters 
involving the ADEA. The RFOA defense is “essentially that the employer 
did not need to rely on age in a discriminatory manner, because it had other 
                                                                                                                     
unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of 
racial or other impermissible classification.” Id. at 431. 
35 Biggins, 507 U.S. at 610 (citations omitted) (“[W]e have never decided whether a disparate 
impact theory of liability is available under the ADEA . . . and we need not do so here.”). Yet, lower 
courts had applied disparate impact theory to the ADEA with some frequency. See cases cited infra note 
128. 
36 Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 232 (2005).  
37 Id. at 231 (discussing that the petitioners were a group of older officers who claimed that their 
employer had discriminated against them because of a pay plan that granted raises to all City employees 
in a disproportionate manner).  
38 The Eleventh Circuit in Villarreal II, 839 F.3d 958, 961 (11th Cir. 2016), and the Seventh Circuit 
in Kleber II, 914 F.3d 480, 481 (7th Cir. 2019).  
39 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2012). 
40 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). 
41 Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 554 U.S. 84, 97 (2008).  
42 Gold, supra note 30, at 55. See also Meacham, 544 U.S. at 97 (confirming that the RFOA 
exemption is an affirmative defense). 
43 Meacham, 554 U.S. at 100.  
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valid [and reasonable] reasons for making the same decision, and therefore 
it cannot be shown to have discriminated on the basis of age.”44 By allowing 
such a defense, the Court has acknowledged that “certain employment 
criteria that are routinely used may be reasonable despite their adverse 
impact on older workers as a group.”45 To illustrate this point, an 
employment policy that replaces a highly paid worker with a lower-paid 
worker would likely have a disparate impact on older workers but would be 
permissible under the RFOA defense because the practice is a reasonable 
means to lower costs.   
This “reasonable factors” defense is a more lenient standard of 
justification than under the disparate treatment requirement in the ADEA, 
which requires the employer to provide a bona fide occupational 
qualification (also known as the BFOQ defense) to justify differential 
treatment.46 Under the BFOQ defense, an employer may refuse to hire an 
older worker based on his age if being younger is a bona fide occupational 
qualification.47 For example, mandatory retirement age requirements for 
airline pilots are allowed as a BFOQ because of proven safety concerns.48 
The BFOQ defense requires an examination into whether there was an 
alternative method that would not impact older workers and still achieve the 
desired outcome, but the RFOA does not require this inquiry.  
In establishing a prima facie case of disparate impact under the ADEA, 
the plaintiff must (1) identify a specific employment policy or practice and 
(2) establish that it harmed older workers substantially more than younger 
workers with employment decisions made on the basis of the plaintiff’s 
age.49 The burden of producing evidence and the burden of persuasion50 then 
shift to the employer to establish that it relied on a factor other than age that 
was designed and administered reasonably to achieve a legitimate business 
purpose in light of the circumstances, including the potential harm to older 
workers.51 If the employer can make such a showing, the plaintiff still has 
the opportunity to show that the employer’s reasons are pretext for 
discrimination, or that there is an alternative employment practice that does 
not disparately impact older workers, which also serves the employer’s 
legitimate interests.52 
                                                                                                                     
44 Evan H. Pontz, Comment, What a Difference ADEA Makes: Why Disparate Impact Theory 
Should Not Apply to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 74 N.C. L. REV. 267, 275 (1995). 
45 Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 241 (2005). 
46 Gold, supra note 30, at 55, 62–63. 
47 Id. at 55. 
48 EEOC v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 560 F. App’x 282, 289 (5th Cir. 2014).  
49 Pontz, supra note 44, at 284–85. 
50 See Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 554 U.S. 84, 93 (2008) (explaining that the burden 
of persuasion falls on the “one who claims its benefits”).  
51 Pontz, supra note 44, at 285. 
52 Id.  
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II. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
Courts employ a variety of approaches when interpreting statutes. They 
generally look to the ordinary meaning of the text and the organizational 
structure of the statute itself, as well as to the legislative purpose in enacting 
the statute and the legislative history.53 Courts also often compare statutes 
under their review with other statutes utilizing similar language to infer 
similar, or different, meanings in congressional intent.54 Courts generally 
begin with the statutory language, but when the ordinary language of the 
statute has various viable readings, they regularly look to external factors 
such as the legislative history and how the administrative agency tasked with 
administering and enforcing the act interprets it.55 The next several sections 
of this Note consider each of the various modes of interpretation and apply 
them to the text and legislative history of the ADEA. 
A. Analyzing the Text of the Statute 
Courts commonly start their statutory interpretation by looking to the 
ordinary meaning of the language used in the act, taken as a whole,56 to 
discover the legislature’s original intent. Section 4(a) of the ADEA provides 
in relevant part:  
It shall be unlawful for an employer— 
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or 
otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to 
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual’s age; 
                                                                                                                     
53 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., INTERPRETING LAW: A PRIMER ON HOW TO READ STATUTES AND 
THE CONSTITUTION 26 (2016). However, it is important to note that Justices on the Supreme Court 
disagree on the relative weight to be given to these criteria. For example, Justice Breyer “has strongly 
defended consideration of legislative history in order to discern the legislative intent.” Frank B. Cross, 
The Significance of Statutory Interpretive Methodologies, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1971, 1974 (2007). 
On the other hand, Justices Scalia and Kennedy have “explicitly rejected the validity of legislative 
history” with Justice Stevens also cautioning its unreliability as a “guide to interpretation.” Id. at 1975. 
Most famously and well known is the fact that Justices Gorsuch and the late Scalia “demonstrate a 
commitment to textualism and originalism” meaning they believe they “must follow the text, as written, 
without recourse to authorial or legislative intent.” Max Alderman & Duncan Pickard, Justice Scalia’s 
Heir Apparent?: Judge Gorsuch’s Approach to Textualism and Originalism, 69 STAN. L. REV. 185, 186 
(2017).  
54 The ADEA is often compared to Title VII because of the similar language used by Congress in 
these two statutes. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 233 (2005) (noting the identical 
language between the ADEA and Title VII and other parallel provisions in comparing the two statutes); 
Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978) (stating that “the prohibitions of the ADEA were derived in 
haec verba from Title VII” when comparing Title VII to the ADEA). 
55 ESKRIDGE JR., supra note 53, at 422, 434 (discussing the legislative history rule and the 
administrability canon in the Supreme Court’s interpretations of statutes). 
56 Id. at 85.  
 
 
2020] “OVER-THE-HILL” 515 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way 
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of 
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his 
status as an employee, because of such individual’s age . . . .57  
Courts have held section 4(a)(1) to be limited to claims of disparate 
treatment because of its focus on taking discriminatory actions “because of 
such individual’s age,” thereby requiring proof of intentional 
discrimination.58 Courts have held section 4(a)(2), in contrast, to encompass 
disparate impact discrimination as well as overt age-based actions.59  
In analyzing the language of section 4(a)(2), courts have grappled with 
how to interpret several terms. One ambiguous term in section 4(a)(2) that 
the Supreme Court has examined is the meaning of “age.”60 The phrase 
“because of an individual’s age” could be interpreted broadly to include 
claims by both younger and older individuals.61 However, in General 
Dynamics Land System v. Cline, the Supreme Court concluded that a 
“narrower reading is the more natural one in the textual setting”62 and held 
that the ADEA does not stop employers from “favoring an older employee 
over a younger one.”63 The Court, considering the structure and purpose of 
the ADEA, reasoned that Congress designed the statute to “manifestly . . . 
protect the older from arbitrary favor [of] the younger.”64 The Court also 
looked to precedent, which had not directly addressed the question at issue, 
but reflected a consistent understanding that the ADEA is a remedy for 
“unfair preference based on relative youth.”65 The Cline case helps illustrate 
that courts must assess ambiguous terms with multiple meanings in light of 
the ADEA’s context, structure, purpose, and history. 
The Court has also considered the meaning of the term “employees.”66 
Section 4(a)(2) prohibits limiting, segregating, or classifying “employees” 
based on their ages.67 On the surface, the term “employees” seems to refer 
merely to those individuals that currently have an existing employment 
                                                                                                                     
57 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)–(2) (2016). 
58 Smith, 544 U.S. at 236 n.6 (discussing the differing treatment of motive between section 4(a)(1) 
and 4(a)(2), concluding that section 4(a)(1) focuses on the employer’s discriminatory motives, therefore 
authorizing disparate treatment claims). 
59 Id. at 236 (concluding that section 4(a)(2) “focuses on the effects of the action on the employee 
rather than the motivation for the action of the employer”).  
60 Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 584 (2004) (determining whether the 
ADEA prohibits favoring the old over the young in addition to preference for the young over the old). 
61 Id. at 586 (agreeing “[i]n the abstract, [that] the phrase is open to an argument for a broader 
construction, since reference to ‘age’ carries no modifier and the word could be read to look two ways”). 
62 Id. at 598.  
63 Id. at 600.  
64 Id.  
65 Id. at 593.  
66 Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997). 
67 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) (2012). 
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relationship with an employer. However, in a case involving the claim of a 
former employee, the Supreme Court held that the term “employees,” as 
used in a comparable provision in Title VII, was ambiguous.68 The 
complainant brought a suit against his former employer alleging that 
postemployment actions were taken to retaliate against him for a different 
claim he had filed.69 The Supreme Court took up the question of whether the 
term “employees” was limited to current employees or could include former 
employees.70 The Court held that the term, “employees,” “standing alone[,] 
is necessarily ambiguous.”71 It then considered “whether the context gives 
the term a further meaning that would resolve the issue in dispute.”72 The 
Court concluded that extending coverage to former employees was 
consistent with the broader context and primary purpose of Title VII, 
because of “several sections of the statute [that] plainly contemplate that 
former employees will make use of the remedial mechanisms of Title VII.”73 
Since the term “employees” has been held to be ambiguous in Title VII’s 
comparable statutory language, similarly in section 4(a)(2) of the ADEA the 
term “employees” need not only be taken to be limited to current employees, 
but rather it could also extend to include prospective employees such as 
applicants for employment.  
However, even if the term “employees” in section 4(a)(2) of the ADEA, 
standing alone, is taken to mean solely current employees of the defendant 
employer, section 4(a)(2) could still apply to applicants because of the 
interplay of the term “employees” with the phrase “any individual.” An 
employer that has experience caps in hiring illustrates this point. The 
employer in this example is, in essence, classifying its employees within the 
meaning of section 4(a)(2) of the ADEA because it will only hire employees 
with less than the prescribed experience requirement. Therefore, even in 
taking “employees” to mean current employees of the defendant employer, 
section 4(a)(2) could still apply to applicants because by denying an older, 
more experienced applicant employment, it is essentially limiting and 
classifying its employees in a way that deprives “any individual of 
employment opportunities.”74 Job applicants are among the “any 
individuals” who are deprived of employment opportunities by this 
employer’s limitation of employees. 
                                                                                                                     
68 Robinson, 519 U.S. at 341. 
69 Id. at 339. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 343. 
72 Id. at 344. 
73 Id. at 345. The Court noted section 703(a) as one such section that “includes discriminatory 
‘discharge’ as one of the unlawful employment practices against which Title VII is directed.” Id.  
74 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) (2012). 
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B. Comparison of Section 4(a)(2) with Other Sections of the ADEA 
An analysis of the ADEA section 4(a)(2), which looks to the textual 
differences between this section and other sections of the ADEA and 
comparable provisions in other statutes, also reaches inconclusive results. 
This Note breaks down each textual argument both in favor of, and opposed 
to, the availability of a disparate impact claim for applicants and 
demonstrates that courts should not put too much weight on the use of any 
one textual phrase. 
In section 4(a)(1), which clearly applies the disparate treatment 
prohibition to job applicants because of its explicit listing of “refuse to hire” 
as a covered employment action, Congress uses the phrase “any individual” 
twice: “It shall be unlawful for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to 
discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual . . 
. because of such individual’s age.”75 Congress also chose to use the same 
expansive “any individual” language in section 4(a)(2) instead of specifying 
“any employee,”76 which it easily could have done. This can lead courts 
interpreting the statute to reasonably conclude that “any individual,” when 
used in both sections 4(a)(1) and 4(a)(2), means the same thing—applying 
to both employees and applicants.77   
The counterargument is that Congress could have used the phrase “any 
individual” twice in section 4(a)(2) like it did in 4(a)(1), yet it intentionally 
chose not to. But this argument is inconclusive; one could just as well say 
that Congress could have used the term “employees” twice to eliminate this 
ambiguity, yet it intentionally chose to include the more expansive “any 
individual” language. Therefore, these countervailing arguments negate the 
inference that the word choice signals anything meaningful about 
congressional intent.  
The only section of the ADEA that does not use the phrase “any 
individual” is section 4(a)(3).78 Section 4(a)(3) makes it unlawful for an 
employer to “reduce the wage rate of any employee.”79 The American 
Association of Retired People (AARP),80 which has filed numerous amicus 
                                                                                                                     
75 Id. § 623(a)(1) (emphasis added). 
76 Nicholas Piacente, No Prior Experience Desired: Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. and 
the Scope of Disparate Impact Claims Under the ADEA, 91 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1005, 1018 (2017).  
77 ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 
170 (2012) (“[W]here a word has a clear and definite meaning when used in one part of a . . . document, 
but has not when used in another, the presumption is that the word is intended to have the same meaning 
in the latter as in the former part.”).   
78 Brief for the AARP as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant at 7, Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds 
Tobacco Co., 806 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2015) (No. 15-10602) [hereinafter Brief for the AARP]. 
79 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(3) (2018). 
80 “[The] AARP is a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization with a membership of nearly 38 million . 
. . .” AARP, 2017 AARP ANNUAL REPORT 37 (2017). When an individual reaches the age of fifty, they 
receive in the mail the dreaded solicitation for membership in the AARP—a symbol of inevitable aging. 
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curiae briefs to advocate for older workers’ right to pursue disparate impact 
claims,81 stated the argument aptly: “Section 4(a)(3) demonstrates that 
Congress knew how to limit a prohibited practice to current employees by 
using only the term ‘employees’ and not the broader term ‘any individual’ 
in the textual description of the prohibited practice.”82 
This suggests that Congress would have used the phrase “any employee” 
and not “any individual,” if it wanted section 4(a)(2) to only apply to 
employees, not applicants. Since Congress did not, the argument is that “any 
individual” should apply broadly to include applicants for employment.  
However, a strong counterargument is that other provisions of the 
ADEA specify both applicants and employees, indicating that Congress 
knew how to reference job applicants but intentionally chose not to do so in 
the disparate impact portion.83 Section 4(c)(2) makes it unlawful for a labor 
organization to adversely affect an individual’s status as an “employee or as 
an applicant for employment” because of an individual’s age.84 Section 4(d) 
is the portion that prohibits retaliation against any of the employer’s 
“employees or applicants for employment.”85 These provisions of the ADEA 
both explicitly specify employees and applicants, which supports an 
inference that Congress would have added “or applicants for employment” 
if it intended to cover applicants. This inference becomes stronger when 
Congress used the omitted phrase in “close proximity,”86 and these 
provisions follow shortly after section 4(a)(2). 
The question then becomes whether the absence of this phrase in section 
(a)(2) is meaningful. In answering that question, courts have considered 
“whether Congress intended its different words to make a legal 
difference.”87 However, courts are reluctant to draw significance from 
                                                                                                                     
But with that membership also come undeniably valuable benefits. Among those benefits is the AARP’s 
vigorous advocacy for its members’ interests, including helping older workers overcome obstacles in the 
workplace. Brief for the AARP, supra note 78, at 1. The AARP has been around and involved in this 
issue from the beginning. AARP History, AARP (May 10, 2010), https://www.aarp.org/about-
aarp/company/info-2016/history.html (documenting that the AARP was founded in 1958, having 
evolved from the National Retired Teachers Association, which had been established since 1947). It has 
also been conducting legal advocacy to advance the legal rights and interests of people fifty and older 
through its AARP Foundation Litigation (AFL). AARP Foundation Legal Advocacy, AARP FOUND., 
https://www.aarp.org/aarp-foundation/our-work/legal-advocacy/?intcmp=FTR-LINKS-FOU-LEGAL-
EWHERE (last visited Mar. 13, 2019).  
81 Brief for the AARP, supra note 78, at 2 (citing Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005), 
as a landmark case in which the AARP filed an amicus curiae brief). 
82 Id. at 7. 
83 Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Maclean, 135 S. Ct. 913, 919 (2015) (“Congress generally acts 
intentionally when it uses particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another.”). 
84 29 U.S.C. § 623(c)(2) (2012). 
85 Id. § 623(d)(2). 
86 Maclean, 135 S. Ct. at 919. 
87 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 62–63 (2006).  
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differences in wording between provisions that differ in scope.88 Section 4(c) 
covers labor organizations, which protect the combined interests of workers 
by collective bargaining with their employers.89 Labor organizations do not 
directly hire or fire an employer’s employees, making the purpose and scope 
of section 4(c) vastly different than that of section 4(a), which only applies 
to employers. Section 4(d) creates a retaliation protection, which prohibits 
employers from taking adverse action against an employee or applicant 
engaged in a protected activity, such as opposing an unlawful practice.90 The 
retaliation coverage is not determined by claims of disparate treatment or 
disparate impact based on age. Anyone who speaks out against unlawful 
discrimination is covered by the retaliation provision, making section 4(d) 
significantly different in scope from section 4(a). 
The arguments on both sides of the textual analysis further evidence that 
we should not put too much weight in the use of the terms “employee” and 
“any individual” in section 4(a)(2) to try to glean the congressional intent. 
As explained below, despite the absence of express language implicating 
applicants in section (a)(2), there is strong reason to believe that Congress 
intended to cover applicants. A comparison with the language in Title VII 
helps illuminate this intent. 
C. Comparison of the ADEA with Title VII 
Since Congress passed the ADEA soon after the passage of Title VII, 
and because much of the language is similar, courts often compare the 
language between the two. Section 703(a)(2) of Title VII is the relevant 
provision that applies to disparate impact claims. It provides in relevant part:  
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—
. . . 
 (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants 
for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to 
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or 
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because 
of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin.91 
The clear discrepancy between the current disparate impact provisions 
in Title VII and the ADEA could be read to imply that the ADEA only 
                                                                                                                     
88 See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 355–56 (2013) (finding a fundamental 
difference in statutory scope between the provisions of section 2000e-2(m) and Title IX, sections 1981 
and 1982 and several provisions of the ADEA and therefore declining to draw inferences from differences 
between them).  
89 29 U.S.C. § 623(c) (2012). 
90 Id. § 623(d). 
91 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012). 
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explicitly applies to “employees,” whereas Title VII applies to either 
“employees or applicants for employment.” Before 1972, however, the 
relevant portion of Title VII was virtually identical to that of the ADEA.92 
The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 amended Title VII to add 
“or applicants for employment” to the language that parallels the ADEA 
section (4)(a)(2).93  
The amendment of Title VII has been used to argue that ADEA disparate 
impact claims should not extend to applicants. The argument goes: it is 
presumed that Congress acted intentionally by specifically choosing to 
change Title VII, yet failing to make the same change to the ADEA.94 The 
Supreme Court employed this analysis when considering whether the ADEA 
permitted mixed motive liability or required but-for causation in Gross v. 
FBL Financial Services, Inc.95 In that case, the Court refused to apply Title 
VII decisions that had established a “motivating factor” test for disparate 
treatment claims to the interpretation of the ADEA because Congress had 
amended Title VII to expressly include that standard, but had intentionally 
decided not to amend the ADEA in a similar way.96 
The problem with this argument, however, is that, at the time of the 
amendment of Title VII that added “or applicants for employment” to 
section 703(a)(2), there was no reason for Congress to look at the 
comparable provision in the ADEA. The 1972 Equal Employment 
Opportunity Act exclusively addressed Title VII. There were no proposed 
amendments to the ADEA in front of Congress at the time.97 In contrast, 
when Title VII was amended to add the motivating factor language in 1991, 
the ADEA was also “contemporaneously amended . . . in several ways.”98 
Therefore, the argument that we should draw an inference from the fact that 
Congress did not amend the ADEA at the same time it amended Title VII is 
attenuated because the ADEA was not before the legislature at the time. 
Further, the conference committee report to the Senate stated that the 
addition of “applicants for employment” to Title VII was intended “to make 
it clear that discrimination against applicants for employment . . . is an 
unlawful employment practice” and the additional language was “merely 
                                                                                                                     
92 Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 233 (2005) (“Except for substitution of the word ‘age’ 
for the words ‘race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,’ the language of that provision in the ADEA 
is identical to that found in § 703(a)(2) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII).”).  
93 Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 8(a), 86 Stat. 109 (1972). 
94 Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 557 U.S. 167, 174 (2009). 
95 Id. at 173. 
96 Id. at 175.  
97 ADEA and Amendments, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/adea50th/adea.cfm (last visited Mar. 13, 2019) (listing the 
amendments to the ADEA, with the first amendment after its passage in 1967 being in 1974—two years 
after the amendment to Title VII).  
98 Gross, 557 U.S. at 174.  
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declaratory of present laws.”99 This signals that the amendment was not 
necessary in order for the prior language, which mirrors that of the ADEA, 
to apply to applicants.100 Congress was merely making it explicitly clear, 
reiterating what courts had already decided—that the disparate impact 
language of Title VII covered applicants for employment.  
In early cases that established disparate impact liability under the 
ADEA, courts presumed that Congress intended the text to have the same 
meaning in both Title VII and the ADEA.101 In Griggs v. Duke Power, the 
Supreme Court interpreted the language of section 703(a)(2) of Title VII 
prior to its amendment, making it a reliable reading of how to interpret the 
nearly identical language that appeared in the ADEA.102 The Court in Griggs 
held that the same language contained in the ADEA included disparate 
impact protection for both current employees and job seekers.103 The 
Supreme Court has applied the authoritative construction of identical 
statutory language in Griggs as controlling when interpreting section 4(a)(2) 
of the ADEA.104 In Smith v. City of Jackson, the Court held that Griggs’s 
conclusion that section 703(a)(2) of Title VII allows for disparate impact 
claims “strongly suggests that a disparate-impact theory should be 
cognizable under the ADEA.”105 
Recently, the Supreme Court, in Texas Department of Housing & 
Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities, held that Griggs and other 
cases interpreting Title VII and the ADEA provided essential background 
and instruction in interpreting the Fair Housing Act (FHA), even though its 
wording differed from section 703(a)(2) of Title VII.106 This provides further 
support for the use of Griggs, which was interpreting Title VII, to interpret 
other statutes, including the ADEA, despite minor textual differences in the 
statutes. In Inclusive Communities, the Court looked to the three statutes—
the FHA, Title VII, and the ADEA—and concluded that despite differences 
in language, “Congress . . . chose words that serve the same purpose and 
bear the same basic meaning . . . .”107 Therefore, a comparison of Title VII 
                                                                                                                     
99 118 CONG. REC. 7166, 7169 (Mar. 6, 1972).  
100 See Rabin v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 236 F. Supp. 3d 1126, 1131 (2017) (finding the 
amendment to Title VII “signaled that Griggs had properly interpreted Title VII as protecting both 
employees and applicants. Therefore, the amendment supports, rather than detracts from, an 
interpretation of the ADEA as likewise covering both employees and applicants”).  
101 Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 233 (2005). 
102 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 426 n.1 (1971). 
103 Id. at 430–31. See also Kleber II, 914 F.3d 480, 496 (7th Cir. 2019) (Hamilton, J., dissenting) 
(discussing how to follow the interpretation used in Griggs in ADEA cases). 
104 See, e.g., Smith, 544 U.S. at 233–34 (describing the Griggs analysis as it applies to the ADEA); 
Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2517 (2015) 
(citing the ADEA as a “relevant statute that bears on the proper interpretation of the FHA”).  
105 Smith, 544 U.S. at 236. 
106 Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2518. 
107 Id. at 2519.  
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to the ADEA demonstrates that the lack of any reference to “applicants” in 
the ADEA is not dispositive. It certainly does not support the inference that 
Congress intended, by that omission, to keep disparate impact claims 
unavailable to applicants.  
D. Legislative History and Intent 
When there is ambiguity in the statutory text, courts often look to 
legislative history for clarification.108 In the findings and purpose section of 
the ADEA, Congress declared that “older workers find themselves 
disadvantaged . . . especially to regain employment when displaced from 
jobs . . . .”109 Further, Congress stated that it was the “purpose of this chapter 
to promote employment of older persons based on their ability rather than 
age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment . . . .”110 These 
declarations indicate that Congress intended the statute to cover age 
discrimination against more than just employees, but also to extend 
protection to older applicants.111 
Outside the statutory text, Congress’s intent is apparent from the 
Department of Labor’s Wirtz Report.112 Prior to the enactment of the ADEA, 
Congress had directed the Department to study and report on factors that 
might result in discrimination in employment because of age and the 
consequences of such discrimination.113 In its findings, the Report described 
how specific age limits in hiring are one of the most obvious types of age 
discrimination in employment.114 Significantly, the Report also addressed 
employment practices that have a disparate impact, stating that it would be 
necessary “not only to deal with overt acts of discrimination, but also to 
adjust those present employment practices which quite unintentionally lead 
to age limits in hiring.”115  
The Report recommended age discrimination legislation, which 
provided the initiative for the passage of the ADEA.116 The ADEA’s 
statement of findings and purpose incorporates several of the Department of 
                                                                                                                     
108 See ESKRIDGE JR., supra note 53, at 198 (“For more than a century, federal judges have been 
willing to consider legislative history.”).  
109 29 U.S.C. § 621(a)(1) (2012). 
110 Id. § 621(b). 
111 Senator Ralph Yarborough, the chief sponsor of the ADEA in the Senate, stated “[i]n simple 
terms, this bill prohibits discrimination in hiring and firing workers.” 113 CONG. REC. 31,248, 31,252 
(1967). 
112 In this report, W. Willard Wirtz called age discrimination the “most deserving and much 
neglected cause” hoping that the report would “provide the impetus for effective measures.” WIRTZ 
REPORT, supra note 1, at ii.  
113 Michael C. Harper, ADEA Doctrinal Impediments to the Fulfillment of the Wirtz Report Agenda, 
31 U. RICH. L. REV. 757, 758 (1997). 
114 WIRTZ REPORT, supra note 1, at 6.  
115 Id. at 22.  
116 Harper, supra note 113, at 762. 
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Labor’s goals and the reasoning in the Wirtz Report, which supports the 
connection between the Report and the ADEA when analyzing 
congressional intent.117 The Supreme Court has also relied repeatedly on the 
Wirtz Report to interpret the ADEA.118 In fact, in Cline, the Court even went 
so far as to use the Wirtz Report to conclude that the ADEA did not cover 
discrimination in favor of older workers, despite statutory language that 
could support that reading. The Court held that “[t]he ADEA’s ban on 
‘arbitrary limits’ thus applies to age caps that exclude older applicants, 
necessarily to the advantage of younger ones,” citing the Wirtz Report as 
evidence that the intent behind the statute was to protect older applicants.119  
The Wirtz Report and the statutory purpose articulated in the findings 
and purpose sections of the ADEA indicate that Congress enacted the ADEA 
to address discriminatory barriers in the hiring of older workers and intended 
for the ADEA to protect older prospective job applicants, not just current 
employees, from practices having a disparate impact. 
E. EEOC Interpretations 
If, even after looking at the ordinary meaning of the text and the 
legislative history, the statute is still ambiguous, courts may then consider 
interpretations from the agency charged with enforcing the statute, which 
has the authority to interpret the statute through rulemaking or 
adjudication.120 Courts will uphold agency regulations that interpret 
ambiguous statutory terms, as long as they are reasonable.121 This is known 
as Chevron deference, which is granted to administrative interpretations 
when Congress has delegated authority to the agency to make rules carrying 
the force of law.122 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
                                                                                                                     
117 Id. See also Kleber II, 914 F.3d 480, 487–88 (7th Cir. 2019) (“Nobody disputes that the Wirtz 
Report reinforces Congress’s clear aim of enacting the ADEA to prevent age discrimination in the 
workplace by encouraging the employment of older persons, including older job applicants.”).  
118 See, e.g., Smith v. Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 254 (2005) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (stating that 
“the ADEA was modeled on the Wirtz Report’s findings and recommendations,” so “the Report provides 
critical insights into the statute’s meaning”); Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 590 
(2004) (noting the “unmistakable references to the Wirtz Report’s finding[s]” in the ADEA).  
119 Cline, 540 U.S. at 590.  
120 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984) (“[T]here 
is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by 
regulation. Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight . . . .”); see also United States v. 
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001) (recognizing that “express congressional authorizations to engage 
in the process of rulemaking or adjudication that produces regulations or rulings” is a good indicator of 
delegation meriting deference by the courts). 
121 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 (stating that such “regulations are given controlling weight unless 
they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute”); see also EEOC v. Commercial 
Office Prods. Co., 486 U.S. 107, 115 (1988) (“[T]he EEOC’s interpretation of ambiguous language need 
only be reasonable to be entitled to deference.”). 
122 Mead, 533 U.S. at 226–27. It is worth acknowledging that the use of Chevron deference has 
been contested and the doctrine significantly narrowed by Supreme Court opinions over the years. See, 
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(EEOC) enforces the ADEA, and Congress has expressly delegated the 
authority to issue rules to effectuate the statute to it.123 Therefore, courts are 
compelled to defer to reasonable EEOC rules when addressing the meaning 
of ambiguous statutory language in the ADEA.124  
The EEOC has issued a disparate impact regulation that states: “Any 
employment practice that adversely affects individuals within the protected 
age group on the basis of older age is discriminatory unless the practice is 
justified by a ‘reasonable factor other than age.’”125 By utilizing the word 
“individuals,” the EEOC effectively did not distinguish between prospective 
and existing employees. Some courts have discussed the regulation as 
grounds for treating section 4(a)(2) of the ADEA as “covering 
disparate-impact claims . . . and thus protect[ing] applicants for 
employment.”126 Since the EEOC, the agency charged with enforcing the 
ADEA, has reasonably and consistently interpreted the statute to allow for 
disparate impact claims by job applicants, this interpretation provides yet 
another reason for courts to conclude that the ambiguous statutory language 
should be read to authorize disparate impact claims by applicants.  
                                                                                                                     
e.g., Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2121 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (calling for 
reconsideration of the “premises that underlie Chevron and how courts have implemented that decision”); 
Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712–13 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that the Chevron 
deference doctrine allows for  “potentially unconstitutional delegations” because of its encroachment on 
judicial powers and consideration of agency policymaking); Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 
1152 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“Chevron seems no less than a judge-made doctrine for 
the abdication of the judicial duty.”). 
123 29 U.S.C. § 628 (2012) (“[T]he Equal Employment Opportunity Commission may issue such 
rules and regulations as it may consider necessary or appropriate for carrying out this chapter . . . .”). 
124 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 (“We have long recognized that considerable weight should be 
accorded to an executive department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer, 
and the principle of deference to administrative interpretations . . . .”). However, when the delegation of 
rulemaking is not clear from the empowering statute, courts apply Skidmore deference. Theodore W. 
Wern, Judicial Deference to the EEOC Interpretations of the Civil Rights Act, the ADA, and the ADEA: 
Is the EEOC a Second Class Agency?, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1533, 1539–40 (1999). The EEOC is entitled to 
Chevron deference for interpretations and regulations based on the ADEA. See Smith v. City of Jackson, 
544 U.S. 228, 245 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that “the EEOC’s reasonable view that the 
ADEA authorizes disparate-impact claims is deserving of” Chevron deference). This is because Congress 
explicitly delegated to the EEOC the authority to promulgate rules with the force of law. 29 U.S.C. § 628 
(2012). However, the EEOC has only been held to have Skidmore deference for interpretations of Title 
VII. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141 (1976), reh’g denied, 429 U.S. 1079 (1977). This is 
because the EEOC was not granted the authority to promulgate rules with the force of law under Title 
VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (2012) (granting the EEOC only the authority to issue “suitable 
procedural regulations” for Title VII). 
125 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(c) (2012). See also 29 C.F.R. pt. 1625 (1981) (tracing the history of the 
predecessor regulation which shows that the regulation has been the same for over thirty years). 
126 Kleber II, 914 F.3d 480, 504 (7th Cir. 2019) (Hamilton, J., dissenting) (citing Smith, 544 U.S. at 
266); see also Villarreal I, 806 F.3d 1288, 1299 (11th Cir. 2015) (discussing the EEOC’s ADEA disparate 
impact regulation as extending liability to all individuals within the protected age group and noting that 
the court “owe[s] deference to the EEOC’s view”). 
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III. CURRENT CASE LAW: DISPARATE IMPACT CLAIMS UNDER THE ADEA 
From when Congress enacted the ADEA in 1967 to 2015, no court had 
addressed the question, outside of dicta, whether applicants could bring 
disparate impact claims under the ADEA.127 However, over the years, courts 
have applied disparate impact to claims by applicants without raising the 
issue, but assuming that it applied.128 In 2015, the Eleventh Circuit in 
Villarreal was the first court to address, as an issue of first impression, 
whether section 4(a)(2) of the ADEA authorizes disparate impact claims by 
applicants for employment.129 A few years later, in 2018, the Seventh Circuit 
followed suit in Kleber.130 
A. Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. 
1. Background 
Richard Villarreal applied for a sales position at R.J. Reynolds Tobacco 
when he was forty-nine years old.131 However, R.J. Reynolds had a 
recruiting system that targeted candidates two to three years out of college 
and steered away from applicants that had eight to ten years of prior sales 
experience.132 Therefore, Villarreal’s application was effectively screened 
out of the process, although R.J. Reynolds never responded to the 
application and did not inform Villarreal of his rejection.133 Two years later, 
lawyers contacted Villarreal and told him that he had a viable claim of age 
discrimination against R.J. Reynolds.134 Villarreal then filed a charge with 
the EEOC and applied for the same position five more times, for which he 
was rejected by R.J. Reynolds every time.135 Statistics showed that R.J. 
Reynolds had a history of hiring younger applicants.136 So, Villarreal 
brought a lawsuit on behalf of himself and other applicants over the age of 
forty who R.J. Reynolds also rejected for the position, alleging claims of 
                                                                                                                     
127 Brice Smallwood, Extending Disparate Impact Coverage of the ADEA to Applicants: Villarreal 
v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 85 U. CIN. L. REV. 473, 479 (2017). 
128 See, e.g., Katz v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 229 F.3d 831, 835 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[I]n this 
circuit, disparate impact claims are cognizable under the ADEA.”); Smith v. City of Des Moines, 99 F.3d 
1466, 1470 (8th Cir. 1997) (stating that disparate impact claims under the ADEA were cognizable); 
Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1030 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding that the plaintiff had been subjected to 
a hiring practice with discriminatory impact which “may be applied in ADEA cases”).  
129 Villarreal I, 806 F.3d at 1290.  
130 Kleber I, 888 F.3d 868, 872 (7th Cir. 2018). 
131 Villarreal II, 839 F.3d 958, 961 (11th Cir. 2016). 
132 Id. 
133 Id.  
134 Id.  
135 Id.  
136 Smallwood, supra note 127, at 479–80. 
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disparate treatment and disparate impact.137 The district court dismissed the 
disparate impact claim, and Villarreal appealed.138  
2. Villarreal I 
When an Eleventh Circuit panel heard the case for the first time on 
appeal, it “construe[d] § 4(a)(2) of the ADEA to apply to disappointed job 
applicants like Mr. Villarreal.”139 Its analysis started with the ordinary 
language of the statute, looking to Mr. Villarreal’s and R.J. Reynolds’s 
contrary interpretations of the statutory language.140 But because both 
readings seemed “reasonable,”141 the Eleventh Circuit then analyzed the 
EEOC’s reading.142  
The court determined that the EEOC’s regulation “established the 
agency’s view that § 4(a)(2) protects any individual an employer 
discriminates against, regardless of whether that individual is an employee 
or job applicant.”143 The court noted that the preamble to the EEOC’s 
regulation makes it clear that its choice of the term “individuals” covered 
both employees and applicants.144 The court also looked to the Department 
of Labor, the agency that had been tasked with enforcement of the ADEA 
before the EEOC, which had “clarified that neutral ‘pre-employment’ tests 
must be . . . ‘equally applied to all applicants.’”145 The EEOC’s subsequent 
regulation affirmed this longstanding position.146 Therefore, the Eleventh 
Circuit found the EEOC’s interpretation to be reasonable and deserving of 
deference147 and held that the ADEA’s protection against disparate impact 
discrimination applies to applicants.148 However, that holding did not remain 
                                                                                                                     
137 Villarreal II, 839 F.3d at 961–62. 
138 Smallwood, supra note 127, at 480 (“Like the Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits, the district 
court dismissed his disparate impact claim under the theory that only current employees could bring 
disparate impact claims.”). 
139 Villarreal I, 806 F.3d 1288, 1303 (11th Cir. 2015). 
140 “Mr. Villarreal reads § 4(a)(2) to plainly cover his allegations. . . . He says RJ Reynolds ‘limited’ 
its ‘employees’ in a ‘way which would deprive or tend to deprive’ an ‘individual’ like him ‘of 
employment opportunities’ because of his age.” Id. at 1293. “RJ Reynolds, in turn, directs us to the earlier 
term ‘his employees.’ It says the later reference to ‘any individual’ only includes these employees.” Id.  
141 Id. at 1293.  
142 Id. at 1299.  
143 Id. 
144 Id. at 1301. The preamble lists “a number of examples of cases involving job applicants” and 
“declares that the regulation will address ‘neutral practices that act as barriers to the employment of older 
workers.’” Id.  
145 Id. at 1302. 
146 Id.  
147 Id. at 1300.  
148 Id. at 1303. 
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for long—R.J. Reynolds petitioned for a rehearing en banc, which the court 
granted.149 
3. Villarreal II 
The en banc Eleventh Circuit overturned the panel’s decision, divided 
eight-to-three, holding that the ADEA does not protect applicants for 
employment under a disparate impact theory of liability.150 The court 
concluded that the plain text of section 4(a)(2) only covered discrimination 
against employees, not applicants for employment.151 It came to this 
conclusion through a textual analysis that emphasized the phrase “or 
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee”152 in section 4(a)(2), 
which states that it is unlawful for an employer “to limit, segregate, or 
classify his employees in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive 
any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect 
his status as an employee, because of such individual’s age.”153 The court 
held that this phrase made the first action, “deprive or tend to deprive,” a 
subset of the second action, “adversely affect his status as an employee,”154 
meaning an individual is only protected if he has a status as an employee. It 
then invoked statutory context to confirm its reading of the section by 
contrasting section 4(a)(2), which omits any reference to job applicants, with 
other parallel provisions that expressly reference applicants as well as 
employees.155 The Eleventh Circuit refused to consider the legislative 
history or to defer to the EEOC’s interpretation of the statute since it found 
the text to be clear.156 
Judge Martin, writing for the dissent, stated “the majority’s holding[] in 
this case do[es] harm to this court’s precedent and to the nation’s anti-
discrimination laws.”157 The dissent contended that the plain text of the 
ADEA, agency interpretations, and the landmark decision of Griggs all point 
to reaching an opposite conclusion than the majority.158 Since the dissent did 
not prevail, Mr. Villarreal petitioned the United States Supreme Court, 
                                                                                                                     
149 Samantha Pitsch, Quick, Stop Hiring Old People! How the Eleventh Circuit Opened the Door 
for Discriminatory Hiring Practices Under the ADEA, 92 WASH. L. REV. 1605, 1630 (2017).  
150 Villarreal II, 839 F.3d 958, 963 (11th Cir. 2016). 
151 Id.  
152 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) (2012); Villarreal II, 839 F.3d at 963 (“By using ‘or otherwise’ to join the 
verbs in this section, Congress made ‘depriv[ing] or tend[ing] to deprive any individual of employment 
opportunities’ a subset of ‘adversely affect[ing] [the individual’s] status as an employee.’”).  
153 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) (2012) (emphasis added).  
154 Villarreal II, 839 F.3d at 963–64. 
155 Id. at 966.  
156 Id. at 969–70.  
157 Id. at 981 (Martin, J., dissenting). 
158 Id.  
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which eventually denied certiorari.159 No other circuit court addressed the 
issue until the Seventh Circuit in Kleber. 
B. Kleber v. CareFusion 
1. Background 
Dale Kleber, a fifty-eight-year-old attorney, was actively looking for a 
job after his previous employment ended in 2011.160 He had extensive legal 
and business experience and applied to more than 150 positions without any 
success.161 After a few years, he applied for the senior counsel position with 
CareFusion Corporation.162 The job posting listed several requirements 
suitable to Kleber’s experience.163 This posting, however, dictated that 
applicants must have only three to seven years of relevant legal experience, 
and not more than seven years.164 CareFusion did not select Kleber for an 
interview and filled the position with a twenty-nine-year-old.165 Kleber filed 
suit claiming disparate treatment and disparate impact, alleging the seven 
years maximum experience cap had a disparate impact on qualified 
applicants over the age of forty, like himself.166  
2. Kleber I 
Similar to Villarreal I, the Seventh Circuit panel that decided Kleber I 
held that the language of the ADEA did not bar a disparate impact claim for 
applicants.167 The court stated that “protect[ing] both outside job applicants 
and current employees . . . is the better reading of the statutory text.”168 It 
cited the purpose of the ADEA, previous case law, and similar language 
from other employment discrimination statutes, such as the “virtually 
identical statutory language in Title VII,” as support for holding in favor of 
protecting job applicants from disparate impact employment discrimination 
in hiring.169 
                                                                                                                     
159 Villarreal II, 839 F.3d 958 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2292 (2017). 
160 Kleber I, 888 F.3d 868, 871 (7th Cir. 2018). 
161 Id.  
162 Id.  
163 See id. (“The job posting called for ‘a business person’s lawyer’ with the ability ‘to assume 
complex projects,’ which we must assume would be well-suited to Kleber’s skills and experience.”).  
164 Id. The court also noted that CareFusion qualified its maximum experience cap as an “objective 
criterion based on the reasonable concern that an individual with many more years of experience would 
not be satisfied with less complex duties . . . which could lead to issues with retention.” Id.  
165 Id. 
166 Id. The district court dismissed the disparate impact claim relying on a previous Seventh Circuit 
decision in EEOC v. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073 (7th Cir. 1994), which held that the ADEA’s 
disparate impact provision did not cover job applicants not already employed by the defendant. Id. at 
872. 
167 Id. at 889. 
168 Id. at 870.  
169 Id.  
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The panel began its analysis with the statutory language and the “overall 
statutory scheme” of the ADEA.170 The court held that although section 
4(a)(2) does not refer specifically to applicants or hiring decisions, its “broad 
language easily reaches employment practices that hurt older job applicants 
as well as current employees.”171 It explained that “[i]f an employer 
classifies a position as one that must be filled by someone with certain 
minimum or maximum experience requirements, it is classifying its 
employees,”172 and job applicants who are disqualified as a result are also 
“individual[s]” deprived of employment opportunities by this classification 
of employees. Looking specifically at the “status as an employee” language, 
the court maintained: 
[I]f Congress really meant to outlaw employment practices 
that tend to deprive older workers of employment 
opportunities, which it did, but at the same time deliberately 
chose to leave a wide array of discriminatory hiring practices 
untouched, its use of the phrase “status as an employee” would 
have been a remarkably indirect and even backhanded way to 
express that meaning.173  
Additionally, the Seventh Circuit panel considered what the outcome 
would be if it were to hold that disparate impact liability was not available 
for outside job applicants, calling the result “arbitrary and even baffling.”174 
The court illustrated this unfairness by supposing that there were two 
applicants for the CareFusion position—both were in their fifties with more 
than seven years of experience. However, one of the applicants, like Kleber, 
did not currently have a job at CareFusion and the other applicant was a 
current employee which had applied for the job as a transfer or promotion. 
In this situation, only the applicant who already worked for CareFusion 
could sue for disparate impact violation, but the external applicant could 
not.175 The court concluded that it could not “imagine a plausible policy 
reason for drawing that arbitrary line” between inside and outside applicants 
of an employer.176 
However, the Seventh Circuit, similar to the Eleventh Circuit in 
Villarreal I, granted a motion for rehearing en banc in Kleber,177 vacating 
the panel’s initial decision.   
                                                                                                                     
170 Id. at 872 (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000)).  
171 Id.  
172 Id. 
173 Id. at 874.  
174 Id. at 875. 
175 Id. 
176 Id. at 875–76. 
177 Mulvaney, supra note 9. 
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3. Kleber II Majority Opinion 
Upon rehearing, the en banc panel was divided eight-to-four178 when it 
held that the “plain language of § 4(a)(2) makes clear that Congress, while 
protecting employees from disparate impact age discrimination, did not 
extend that same protection to outside job applicants.”179 The en banc court 
based its conclusion on the plain language of the ADEA, reinforced by “the 
ADEA’s broader structure and history.”180 
In its plain language analysis, the Seventh Circuit found that common 
dictionary definitions of “applicants” and “employees” confirmed that 
applicants have no “status as an employee.”181 Moreover, the court 
interpreted Congress’s word choice in the “or otherwise” clause as a catchall 
formulation extending “employee” to the rest of the sentence.182 This 
grammatical construction connects the “any individual” language to “status 
as an employee,” limiting the section, in the court’s opinion, to employees.183 
The court also made the comparison to other provisions of the ADEA that 
distinguish between employees and applicants, drawing the conclusion that 
because section 4(a)(2) only mentions employees and not applicants, 
Congress only authorized employees to bring disparate impact claims.184 
The Seventh Circuit declined to resolve the question presented on the 
basis of statutory purpose or legislative history, stating that it would not use 
“an interpretation of but one provision of the ADEA . . . to advance the 
enactment’s full objectives.”185 The court concluded its responsibility was 
to interpret section 4(a)(2) as it stands, based solely on its plain meaning.186 
Overall, the court felt it “le[ft] teeth in § 4(a)(2)”187 because although its 
decision was unfavorable to Kleber, it still protects older employees who 
encounter age-based disparate impact discrimination in the workplace.  
                                                                                                                     
178 Kleber II, 914 F.3d 480, 480–81 (7th Cir. 2019).  
179 Id. at 481. 
180 Id. 
181 Id. at 482 (citing MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 60, 408 (11th ed. 2003), 
which defines “‘applicant’ as ‘one who applies,’ including, for example, ‘a job [applicant],’ while 
defining ‘employee’ as ‘one employed by another usu[ally] for wages or salary’”).  
182 Id. at 482–83. But see id. at 483 (qualifying that “[i]f the only question were whether a job 
applicant counts as ‘any individual,’ Kleber would be right”). This argument is also made in Villarreal 
II when the Eleventh Circuit interpreted similarly that the “or otherwise” language “operates as a catchall: 
the specific items that precede it are meant to be subsumed by what comes after the ‘or otherwise.’” 
Villarreal II, 839 F.3d 958, 964 (11th Cir. 2016). 
183 Kleber II, 914 F.3d at 483 (“The clear takeaway is that a covered individual must be an 
employee.”). 
184 Id. at 484–85. 
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4. Kleber II Dissent 
Four judges dissented from the outcome in Kleber II.188 Judge Hamilton, 
writing in an opinion much longer than the majority’s, dissented based on 
the reading of the statutory text and a comparison to Title VII’s disparate 
impact provision, which protects both current employees and job-seekers.189 
Hamilton advocated for a reading that would better align with the purpose 
of the ADEA and which would avoid drawing an “utterly arbitrary line.”190 
The dissent asked some important questions, such as: “How does one read a 
bar against depriving ‘any individual’ of ‘employment opportunities’ to 
exclude all cases where a person is looking for a job? And if Congress meant 
to limit the provision’s coverage only to current employees, why didn’t it 
just use the word ‘employee’?”191 The dissent also argued that even if the 
court were to apply the majority’s conclusion that “status as an employee” 
must be implicated to have a disparate impact claim, an employer refusing 
to hire an individual would still fall under section 4(a)(2) because that has 
“the most dramatic possible adverse effect on that individual’s ‘status as an 
employee.’”192 
The dissent also focused on the congressional intent behind enacting the 
ADEA, which was to address “the incidence of unemployment, especially 
long-term unemployment” among older workers, particularly the difficulty 
they faced in trying to “regain employment.”193 Similarly, the dissent looked 
to the practical consequences of the different readings of section 4(a)(2), 
concluding that the majority’s arbitrary line “undermines the stated purpose 
of the statute.”194 
Judge Easterbrook, joining Judge Hamilton’s dissent in part and also 
writing his own, argued that “the statute lacks a plain meaning” because it is 
unclear whether or not the term “individual” includes applicants for 
employment.195 He reasoned that under the majority’s holding, the word 
“individual” has two different meanings within two paragraphs—it includes 
applicants for employment in section 4(a)(1), but only means current or 
former employees in section 4(a)(2).196 Easterbrook emphasized that 
                                                                                                                     
188 Judges Hamilton, Wood, Rovner, and Easterbrook dissented in Kleber II. Id. at 489 (Hamilton, 
J., dissenting).  
189 Id. at 490.  
190 Id.  
191 Id. at 492.  
192 Id. at 493. The dissent further states that “[i]f Congress really meant to exclude job applicants 
from disparate impact protection, the phrase ‘status as an employee’ was a remarkably obscure and even 
obtuse way to express that meaning.” Id. at 494. 
193 Id. at 494 (citing the statute’s stated purpose at 29 U.S.C. § 621(a)(3) (internal quotations 
omitted)). 
194 Id. at 507.  
195 Id. at 488 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). 
196 Id. at 488–89.  
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normally, when one word is used in an adjacent paragraph, the word “means 
a single thing,”197 yet the majority failed to “explain why the statute would 
use ‘individual’ in dramatically different ways within the space of a few 
words.”198 However, Judge Easterbrook took issue with Judge Hamilton’s 
reliance on legislative purpose, stating that the court’s “job is to apply the 
enacted text . . . not to plumb legislators’ hopes and goals.”199 
IV. THE RESULT: ARBITRARY DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT OF EMPLOYEES 
AND APPLICANTS 
With their recent decisions, the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits have 
effectively permitted discrimination based on age by creating substantial 
barriers to employment for older individuals.200 The Eleventh Circuit 
seemed to reason that even though older applicants are not protected under 
the ADEA for disparate impact, they still have recourse for disparate 
treatment.201 But that reasoning disregards the most salient problem many 
older workers face, which is not outright discrimination, but rather neutral 
hiring policies that prevent them from getting jobs for which they are more 
than qualified. Further, intentional discrimination is notoriously difficult to 
prove.202 Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning fails to adequately 
protect older job applicants unless a plaintiff can prove a hiring policy to be 
truly arbitrary, thus supporting an inference of discriminatory purpose. 
Additionally, Congress intended the ADEA to afford more protection to 
applicants. The attorney for the AARP Foundation Litigation representing 
Dale Kleber stated that “[t]he importance of the ADEA law is less about 
people being able to sue for age discrimination and more about making sure 
that employers are not shaping their hiring processes in ways that prevent 
older workers from getting jobs.”203 Several courts’ usage of the Wirtz 
Report when interpreting the ADEA enforces this perspective because the 
Report clarifies the congressional intent as one of promoting “hiring on the 
basis of ability rather than age.”204 The Wirtz Report’s emphasis on hiring 
                                                                                                                     
197 Id. (citing ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, Canon 25: Presumption of Consistent Usage, 
in READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (1st ed. 2012)).  
198 Id. at 489.  
199 Id. at 488.  
200 Commentators have called the Kleber II decision a “setback to older job applicants.” Jonathan 
Stempel, Age Bias Law Does Not Cover Job Applicants: U.S. Appeals Court, REUTERS (Jan. 23, 2019, 
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204 WIRTZ REPORT, supra note 1, at 22.  
 
 
2020] “OVER-THE-HILL” 533 
elucidates that Congress’s enactment of the ADEA came from a place of 
concern for older applicants.  
The question remains why Congress would make such an arbitrary 
distinction between employees and applicants. The court in Kleber I noted 
that “we have not been presented with, and could not imagine on our own, a 
plausible policy reason why Congress might have chosen to allow disparate 
impact claims by current employees, including internal job applicants, while 
excluding outside job applicants.”205 That Congress would make such an 
arbitrary distinction is unlikely, and the fact that courts have found this 
distinction to be implied by a mere wording difference is illogical. This 
exemplifies that a purely textual approach in interpreting statutes can lead to 
an absurdity in results.  
However, the Supreme Court has held that “a literal application of a 
statute, which would lead to absurd consequences, should be avoided 
whenever a reasonable application can be given to it, consistent with the 
legislative purpose.”206 Several state legislatures have codified the 
understanding that absurd results are not intended.207 Here, an overly literal 
application of section 4(a)(2) has led the courts awry, eschewing basic 
conceptions of fairness and proportionality. A reasonable interpretation of 
the language, taking the legislative purpose into consideration, would 
resolve this arbitrary and absurd distinction between employees and 
applicants and allow for disparate impact claims by applicants under the 
ADEA.  
V. RECOMMENDATIONS MOVING FORWARD 
This Note recommends two different approaches to resolving the issue 
of whether the ADEA protects job applicants on a disparate impact theory 
of liability. First, advocates can seek decisions from other circuits with the 
hope of creating a circuit split that will lead to Supreme Court review. 
Alternatively, an outright congressional amendment to the ADEA, to 
eliminate any ambiguity in the language of section 4(a)(2), would clarify 
Congress’s intent to protect older applicants in employment.  
A. Supreme Court Review 
Other circuit courts can, and should, weigh in on this issue. It is 
important, despite the holdings in Villarreal II and Kleber II, to note that the 
                                                                                                                     
205 Kleber I, 888 F.3d 868, 870 (7th Cir. 2018). 
206 United States v. Katz, 271 U.S. 354, 357 (1926).  
207 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 645.17(1) (Westlaw through legislation effective through July 1, 
2019) (“[T]he legislature does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution, or unreasonable 
. . . .”); TEX. GOV’T CODE § 311.021(3) (Westlaw through legislation effective May 29, 2019) (“In 
enacting a statute, it is presumed that . . . a just and reasonable result is intended . . . .”).  
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fight is not entirely over for older job applicants. The fact that despite the 
Eleventh Circuit’s earlier en banc decision disallowing disparate impact 
claims by job applicants, the Seventh Circuit initially felt comfortable 
enough to hold differently and create a circuit split on the issue is cause for 
some hope. If another circuit addresses this issue, it could create a circuit 
split, which might prompt the United States Supreme Court to review the 
issue and resolve it once and for all.208 If the Supreme Court does review this 
issue, the Court should interpret the ADEA as allowing older job applicants 
to make disparate impact claims. The Supreme Court can do this by adopting 
the initial interpretations in Villarreal I and Kleber I, which this Note argues 
were correctly decided before their rehearings en banc.  
First, the Supreme Court should find that the text of the ADEA is 
ambiguous. The Court should then look to the legislative purpose and intent 
behind Congress’s enactment of the ADEA. The Court is also compelled to 
defer to the EEOC’s interpretation under Chevron, which treats employees 
and applicants alike. By following the purpose and intent of the ADEA and 
the EEOC interpretation, the Supreme Court would be able to hold in favor 
of older applicants receiving disparate impact protection.  
Unfortunately, since there is no clear circuit split, Supreme Court review 
seems unlikely at this juncture. The Supreme Court denied review in 
Villarreal,209 and denied Dale Kleber’s recent petition for certiorari.210 
Alternatively, the en banc panel in the majority opinion of Kleber II invited 
Congress to review ADEA section 4(a)(2), proclaiming in its opinion that 
“Congress, of course, remains free to do what the judiciary cannot—extend 
[section] 4(a)(2) to outside job applicants, as it did in amending Title VII.”211 
A congressional amendment would be the quickest way to clarify 
congressional intent.  
B. Congressional Amendment to the ADEA 
When courts have misconstrued what Congress intended, Congress has 
good reason to step in to amend the statute in order to clarify what it 
meant.212 Therefore, Congress should amend the ADEA to effectuate its 
                                                                                                                     
208 Lorraine Bailey, Full Seventh Circuit Hears Age-Bias Arguments, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. 
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intent of protecting older applicants for employment. The simplest way to 
do this would be to amend section 4(a)(2) to expressly include “applicants 
for employment” after “to limit, segregate, or classify his employees.”213 
This language would mirror Title VII and bring the ADEA in line with its 
stated purpose.  
Congress has frequently enacted clarifying amendments in the past to 
overturn Title VII decisions that misconstrued congressional intent. For 
instance, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act214 and several aspects of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991215 were aimed at overturning Supreme Court 
decisions that narrowly construed Title VII.216  
A congressional amendment would be the fastest and most effective way 
to resolve this issue, but getting anything through today’s Congress may 
prove difficult.217 However, this minor amendment to the ADEA might not 
be controversial, as it would merely afford older job applicants the same 
protections against discrimination that people already have when they face 
hiring practices with a discriminatory impact based on race, sex, or religion. 
Additionally, the amendment would surely have the backing of the AARP, 
which has proved to be a powerful lobbyist.218 This issue is, and should be, 
enough to warrant congressional action. Older job applicants are waiting for 
Congress to afford them the same protections as employees. Congress 
should work in a bipartisan manner to benefit the aging workforce 
population. 
CONCLUSION 
The ADEA provides a significant protection for older working 
Americans, but it has been over fifty years since Congress enacted the 
ADEA and courts still do not enforce it the way Congress intended. 
Congress made it abundantly clear in the ADEA’s statement of purpose that 
the intent was to protect older workers in their search for employment when 
                                                                                                                     
213 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) (2012). 
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or related medical conditions.” Id.   
215 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). The Civil Rights Act of 
1991, among other things, codified the disparate impact theory of discrimination, overturning aspects of 
the Supreme Court decision of Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).  
216 See also Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009) (overturning 
the Supreme Court decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007), stating 
that each paycheck which contained discriminatory compensation is a separate violation regardless of 
when the discrimination began); ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 
(2008) (responding to and overturning a number of Supreme Court decisions which had interpreted the 
ADA to limit the rights of persons with disabilities). 
217 See Jay Cost, Why Congress Can’t Manage to Get Anything Done, N.Y. POST (Apr. 22, 2018), 
https://nypost.com/2018/04/22/why-congress-cant-manage-to-get-anything-done/ (describing Congress 
as “[b]eset by gridlock and petty partisanship”). 
218 See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
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displaced from jobs. Taken together, the textual analysis, the legislative 
history, and deference to the EEOC’s interpretation all confirm that 
Congress intended the ADEA to cover applicants from discriminatory 
practices that have a disparate impact.  
“Over-the-Hill” birthday parties should be a time of celebration, not a 
time of concern because an individual’s age leaves him or her vulnerable to 
barriers to employment. In order to ensure that older workers are hired based 
on their ability rather than denied based on their age, disparate impact claims 
ought to be cognizable for job applicants under the ADEA. 
 
